Leo ·
@@gpt-5 did victoria nuland ever comment on the intercepted ukraine conversation. Did she ever explain the context? Or did any US official explain what that was about?
Replies
Leo ·
**Short answer:** Yes. Victoria Nuland and other U.S. officials did comment on the intercepted 2014 call. Nuland apologized for the language, and U.S. officials framed the discussion as normal, candid diplomacy—while pointing to likely Russian involvement in recording/posting the call. They did not offer a detailed, line‑by‑line public “explanation” of the call’s contents beyond that.
Leo ·
What was said, and by whom:
- Victoria Nuland
- Apologized privately to EU counterparts for the “F— the EU” remark. See coverage: The Guardian; BBC; U.S. News.
- In public remarks in Kyiv, she quipped the leak was “pretty impressive tradecraft,” implying Russian involvement (PBS NewsHour).
Leo ·
- State Department (Jen Psaki)
- Acknowledged Nuland had apologized and treated the recording as real without officially authenticating every detail.
- Emphasized the focus should be on the illegal interception/online posting (and likely Russian role) rather than the language.
- Framed the call as routine diplomacy about supporting a peaceful, democratic outcome in Ukraine, not “orchestrating” a government. See: State Dept. briefing coverage (Kyiv Post/C‑SPAN), Reuters, BBC.
Leo ·
- White House (Jay Carney)
- Noted the video was first highlighted by the Russian government, suggesting their role; did not contest the gist of the call (BBC; Atlantic Council summaries; PBS).
Leo ·
Useful contemporaneous coverage:
- BBC: “Ukraine crisis: Leaked phone call embarrasses US” and transcript
- The Guardian: “US official apologises to EU counterparts…”
- Reuters: “Leaked audio reveals embarrassing U.S. exchange on Ukraine, EU”
- PBS NewsHour: “Leaked diplomatic phone conversation…”
- Kyiv Post recap of the State Dept. briefing
Leo ·
If you want, I can pull exact quotes from the briefings and articles.
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 What was the context of the conversation. What were they discussing?
Leo ·
**Context and what they were discussing**
Leo ·
- Time/place: Early February 2014, during the Euromaidan crisis in Ukraine, while President Yanukovych was still in office and mass protests were ongoing. Yanukovych had just floated offers to opposition leaders to join the government.
Leo ·
- Main topic: U.S. diplomats Victoria Nuland (then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs) and Geoffrey Pyatt (U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine) were candidly assessing which Ukrainian opposition figures were best suited to lead a prospective unity/transition government and how to help stabilize the situation.
Leo ·
- Key points they covered:
- Personnel: They discussed opposition leaders by nickname—
- “Yats” (Arseniy Yatsenyuk): Nuland said he was “the guy” with economic/governing experience, implying he should take a leading role (ultimately, he became prime minister after Yanukovych fled).
- “Klitsch” (Vitali Klitschko): They suggested he should stay out of the cabinet initially to avoid an unworkable power balance and “do his political homework.”
- Oleh Tyahnybok: Mentioned as someone who might support from the outside rather than hold top posts.
- International involvement: Nuland said the UN could help “glue this thing,” referencing UN envoy Robert Serry and Ban Ki‑moon as potential facilitators for a peaceful, orderly process.
- U.S./EU roles: Nuland’s “F— the EU” remark reflected frustration with what she saw as a slower, less hands‑on EU approach; the broader thrust was about coordinating international pressure/support for a nonviolent, democratic outcome.
- Next steps: They talked about calls and outreach to Ukrainian actors and the possibility of higher‑level U.S. engagement (e.g., from the Vice President) to nudge things along. They also referenced the need for economic support (IMF/EU assistance) once a credible government was formed.
Leo ·
- How U.S. officials framed it: As routine, behind‑the‑scenes diplomacy—brainstorming about how to encourage a peaceful transition and functional cabinet amid a fast‑moving crisis—not a blueprint for the U.S. “picking” a government. Critics, of course, cited it as evidence of heavy U.S. influence.
Leo ·
If you want exact lines, the BBC has a widely cited transcript of the call here: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 Were Nuland and Pyatt officially involved in negotiations around Yanukovych's offer?
Leo ·
**Short answer:** Not as formal mediators of Yanukovych’s offer. Nuland and Pyatt were deeply engaged U.S. diplomats in Kyiv—meeting both the government and opposition and urging a peaceful, workable transition—but the January 25 offer (PM to Yatsenyuk, deputy PM to Klitschko) was made by Yanukovych directly to opposition leaders, and later formal mediation of the February 21 agreement was led by EU foreign ministers.
Leo ·
What the record shows:
- Jan 25, 2014: Yanukovych publicly offered Yatsenyuk the PM post and Klitschko a deputy PM role after his talks with the opposition. This was not a U.S.-brokered offer. (BBC report) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25896786
- Early Feb: Nuland traveled to Kyiv Feb 5–7 and met Yanukovych and opposition leaders; Pyatt (U.S. Ambassador) maintained daily outreach to government, opposition, and civil society. This was active diplomacy, not formal mediation. (State Dept briefings)
- Daily Press Briefing (Feb 7, 2014): Nuland had “substantive conversations with both the government and the opposition” and the U.S. pushed for creation of a new government but emphasized it was up to Ukrainians. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/221458.htm
- Background Briefing (Feb 19, 2014): Describes U.S./EU efforts to support dialogue, amnesty, and a technical/transition government; notes Nuland’s visit and Pyatt’s ongoing contacts. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221817.htm
- Feb 21, 2014 agreement: The formal deal was brokered and witnessed by EU foreign ministers (Steinmeier, Sikorski, Fabius); Russia’s envoy attended but did not sign. The U.S. was not a signatory mediator. (Text of the agreement) https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/260130/db4f5326f21530cad8d351152feb5e26/140221-ukr-erklaerung-data.pdf
Leo ·
So, while Nuland and Pyatt were “officially involved” in the sense of conducting U.S. diplomacy and engaging all sides, they were not the official negotiators of Yanukovych’s Jan 25 offer, nor the mediators of the Feb 21 settlement (that was the EU role).
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 What did Nuland and Yanukovych discuss in the Feb 5 - 7 trip?
Leo ·
**Short answer:** De‑escalation, a political transition, and economic support tied to reforms.
Leo ·
What Nuland raised with President Yanukovych (Feb 6, 2014) and in her Kyiv meetings generally:
- Stop the violence and defend human rights: Pressed for a non‑violent resolution and immediate de‑escalation on the streets; “there is no place for violence.”
- Restart political dialogue: Urged Yanukovych to continue talks with opposition leaders and the Rada to restore a workable political center.
- Form a “national technical” (unity/transition) government: Backed constitutional/electoral reforms to rebalance power so a transition cabinet could function credibly.
- Link international aid to reforms: Said substantial U.S./EU/IMF support would be available for “a Ukraine that is reforming,” but “nobody is going to give economic support…to an unreformed Ukraine.”
- International facilitation: Noted ideas from the UN/EU and welcomed continued engagement (she even flagged Yanukovych’s meeting with UN Sec‑Gen Ban Ki‑moon in Sochi).
Leo ·
How it was characterized publicly:
- Nuland’s Feb 7 Kyiv press conference summarized these points and said Bankova (the presidency) issued “positive statements” after their session and that Yanukovych would “continue the dialogue” with opposition leaders.
- A senior State Dept. background briefing later described the trip’s goals as de‑escalation, amnesty, constitutional/power‑sharing changes, a technical government, and a path to IMF/EU support and elections.
- Ukrainian readouts via BBC said Yanukovych told Nuland he favored dialogue and compromise with the opposition.
Leo ·
Sources:
- U.S. State Dept., Nuland press conference in Kyiv, Feb 7, 2014: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2014/feb/221468.htm
- State Dept. Daily Press Briefing (Psaki) on the trip/leak, Feb 6, 2014: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/221422.htm
- Senior State Dept. Official background briefing on Ukraine (recapping the strategy around Nuland’s visit), Feb 19, 2014: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221817.htm
- BBC contemporaneous report noting the Yanukovych–Nuland meeting: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26072281
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 If I recall correctly, there was something in the audio about Nuland and Pyatt being surprised that Yanukovich made the power sharing offer. Is that right?
Leo ·
Yes—there’s a line suggesting puzzlement. In the leaked call, right after Pyatt references “the announcement of [Klitschko] as deputy prime minister,” he says: “And again the fact that this is out there right now, I’m still trying to figure out in my mind why Yanukovych [garbled] that.” That reads as surprise/confusion about Yanukovych’s move. They then discuss keeping Klitschko out of the cabinet and backing Yatsenyuk to lead.
Leo ·
Source (BBC transcript): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 who was ultimately chosen as prime minister and deputy prime minister?
Leo ·
**Prime Minister:** Arseniy Yatsenyuk (approved by the Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014).
Leo ·
**Deputy Prime Ministers:**
- Vitaliy Yarema — First Vice Prime Minister
- Oleksandr Sych — Vice Prime Minister (Humanitarian Policy)
- Volodymyr Groysman — Vice Prime Minister (Regional Policy)
Leo ·
Note: Vitali Klitschko did not join the cabinet as deputy PM; UDAR declined posts and he later ran for (and became) mayor of Kyiv.
Leo ·
Sources:
- First Yatsenyuk government (cabinet list): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Yatsenyuk_government
- BBC on Yatsenyuk as PM-designate/approval: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26359150 and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26362789
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 When did Klitschko reject becoming deputy PM? Was this at the suggestion of Nuland?
Leo ·
**When did Klitschko reject the deputy PM post?**
- January 26, 2014. The day after Yanukovych’s offer (Jan 25), opposition leaders publicly rejected the posts, and Klitschko said he would not take the deputy prime minister role.
- BBC: “Opposition rejects offer of PM post” (Jan 26, 2014)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25900267
- CNN: “Ukraine opposition rejects president’s offer” (Jan 26–27, 2014)
https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/world/europe/ukraine-protests
Leo ·
**Was this at Victoria Nuland’s suggestion?**
- No evidence of that, and the timeline argues against it. Klitschko’s rejection was public on Jan 26.
- The leaked Nuland–Pyatt call in which Nuland says “I don’t think Klitsch should go into the government” was posted online in early February (Feb 4–7 coverage) and concerned a prospective transition government, not Yanukovych’s Jan 25 power‑sharing offer.
- BBC transcript of the call (published Feb 7, 2014): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
- NPR coverage (Feb 6, 2014): https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/06/272556045/leaked-phone-call-offers-not-so-diplomatic-u-s-view-of-eu
Leo ·
Bottom line: Klitschko had already rejected the deputy PM offer before Nuland’s comments became public, and there’s no public evidence he did so at her suggestion.
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 What makes you say "The leaked Nuland–Pyatt call in which Nuland says “I don’t think Klitsch should go into the government” was posted online in early February (Feb 4–7 coverage) and concerned a prospective transition government, not Yanukovych’s Jan 25 power‑sharing offer."?
I interpreted the conversations of Nuland and Pyatt as discussing something Yanukovich was offering?
Leo ·
Great question. Here’s why I said the call was about a prospective transition government rather than accepting Yanukovych’s Jan 25 power‑sharing offer:
Leo ·
1) Timing/context
- Yanukovych’s offer (PM to Yatsenyuk; deputy PM to Klitschko) was made Jan 25 and publicly rejected by the opposition on Jan 26. Source: BBC (Jan 26, 2014): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25900267
- The leaked Nuland–Pyatt audio surfaced online Feb 4–6 and hit the press Feb 6–7. That makes it unlikely they were deciding whether to accept the Jan 25 offer, which had already been turned down. Reuters: Feb 6–7 coverage; BBC transcript published Feb 7: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Leo ·
2) What the call itself says
- They react to the public “announcement of [Klitschko] as deputy prime minister,” with Pyatt saying he’s “still trying to figure out…why Yanukovych did that.” That’s a reference to Yanukovych’s move, but as something already “out there,” not something they’re weighing whether to accept.
- Nuland argues for a different configuration: “I think Yats is the guy… what he needs is Klitsch and Tyahnybok on the outside,” and explicitly: “I don’t think Klitsch should go into the government.” That runs counter to Yanukovych’s proposed Klitschko deputy‑PM role and points to a separate plan for a new/transition cabinet with Yatsenyuk at the helm.
- They discuss process support—“have the U.N. help glue this thing,” mention Robert Serry/Ban Ki‑moon, and suggest a call from the U.S. Vice President. That’s the language of facilitating a broader political transition, not haggling over Yanukovych’s specific offer. BBC transcript: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Leo ·
3) Public messaging that week
- In Kyiv on Feb 7, Nuland talked about de‑escalation, constitutional changes, and a “technical”/transition government tied to reforms and IMF/EU support—again, not acceptance of the Jan 25 package. State Dept readout: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2014/feb/221468.htm
Leo ·
So, yes, the call references Yanukovych’s deputy‑PM idea for Klitschko (and they express puzzlement about it), but the thrust of their discussion is a different prospective government lineup and the international “glue” to support it—i.e., a transition scenario rather than the already‑rejected Jan 25 power‑sharing offer.
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 Does that transition scenario imply the removal of Yanukovich?
Leo ·
**Short answer:** Not necessarily. The “transition” scenario they discussed was about assembling a workable unity/technical government and sequencing international support; it did not inherently require removing Yanukovych.
Leo ·
What the record suggests:
- The leaked call focuses on cabinet composition (e.g., “Yats is the guy,” Klitschko staying out) and on getting UN/EU/IMF support lined up. It does not call for ousting Yanukovych. (BBC transcript)
- Under Ukraine’s system at the time, a transition/technical government with Yatsenyuk as prime minister could have been formed while Yanukovych remained president—especially alongside constitutional changes curbing presidential powers. That was the thrust of U.S. public messaging in early/mid‑February: de‑escalation, constitutional reform, a technical government, and early elections. (State Dept backgrounder, Feb 19, 2014)
- The EU‑brokered agreement of Feb 21, 2014—which the U.S. supported—explicitly envisioned Yanukovych staying in office until early elections, alongside a national unity government and a return to the 2004 constitution. His removal only followed after he fled Kyiv on Feb 21–22 and the Rada voted to declare he had withdrawn from his duties. Yatsenyuk became PM on Feb 27. (Text of the agreement)
Leo ·
Sources:
- BBC transcript of the Nuland–Pyatt call: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
- U.S. State Dept background briefing outlining the transition plan (technical gov’t, reforms, elections), Feb 19, 2014: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221817.htm
- Feb 21 agreement text (EU‑brokered): https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/260130/db4f5326f21530cad8d351152feb5e26/140221-ukr-erklaerung-data.pdf
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 So its safe to assume Nuland was discussing offers that were on the table with the "blessing" of Yanukovich, not about a plan to replace him?
Leo ·
Short answer: Not exactly.
Leo ·
- The call overlaps with Yanukovych’s power‑sharing context, but Nuland and Pyatt were advocating a different lineup (e.g., “Yats is the guy,” Klitschko should stay out initially) and talking about how to “glue” it with UN/EU/IMF support. That’s not simply endorsing what Yanukovych had “blessed.”
- At the same time, it wasn’t a plan to depose him. Nothing in the call lays out removing Yanukovych. The scenario they discuss could have fit a unity/technical government and constitutional changes with Yanukovych still as president pending early elections—consistent with the EU‑brokered Feb 21 agreement the U.S. supported.
Leo ·
So: they were trying to shape the composition and sequencing of a transition, not plotting a removal—but also not limiting themselves to Yanukovych’s specific offer.
Leo ·
@@gpt-5 I interpret the situation as them taking advantage of Yanukovich's openness to form a power sharing or transitional government and providing recommendations to the opposition for how to respond to that. Is there anything faulty about that interpretation? Is there an alternative interpretation that is also likely?
Leo ·
Your interpretation is mostly reasonable, with two important caveats.