Drop your best large block readings, articles, debates etc.…

Example of misconception I had: Large block failing to propagate, thus getting orphaned. I think many in BTC see this as a failure of the system, when it in fact is a failure of the miner publishing it, if I understood it correctly.

As video : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hSxLlDlRow
Small blockers fail to see Bitcoin as a network and see just the "coin" part. Bitcoin is a network with a built in monetary system, an anti fragile network that never existed before.

https://twetch.app/t/38b57030db303b4e0453d65401d664a21ac7cefb343709e1497f9d983f7910fb

This one is a good one on something that is very misunderstood by the BTC community. Orphaning and reorgs are natural parts of the nakamoto consensus:
https://www.yours.org/content/on-forks--orphans-and-reorgs-0c0c39d3c79b

https://medium.com/@_unwriter/the-resolution-of-the-bitcoin-cash-experiment-52b86d8cd187

Thank you all so far, will check out the sources and get back.

This is a really good document for the description of nodes in the bitcoin network, and how the bitcoin network can achieve scale by verifying payments simply.

https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf

consider a main difference being who is assigned to fix a problem.

in the free market bitcoin system, the individual actors fail or solve problems.

in the segwit system, problems are managed from the central repository by manipulating the protocol.

For me, start with a simple model of Bitcoin and recognize two things:

First, the block size is determined by the tx processing market, often wrongly called the tx fee market.

Blocks too big? Miners accept less txs. Too small? They accept lower fee txs.

This aspect of the design immediately puts a limit on the size of blocks that is not hard coded, but remains within the limits of a majority of miners as measured by hash power.

Second, we can recognize that real technical limitations, such as those that create an envelope on what a miner is willing, or even able, to accept in a block as discussed above, are largely factors of hardware and software limitations.

Immediately we can then see that according to Moore's law, over time, the technical limitations around block propagation and all else that goes into block creation and acceptance will expand over time as hardware and software improves.

The only limitation that can't be overcome (so far as we know,) is the speed of light, and/or the speed of electrons through wires. However, the average block time is 10 minutes, so this is a very insignificant performance cap when all is said and done.

This understanding alone is sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity of a hard coded, arbitrary limit in the software around which a "consensus" is established.

Once that "solution" is recognized as naive, we can then explore other possibilities.

I believe that a thorough study of the design of Bitcoin, specifically the economics around Nakamoto Consensus and the production structure of mining, leads to the conclusion that the idea configuration is one of competition between miners.

This is synonymous with the true "Big Block Bitcoin," where the protocol is merely the outline within which miners set all limits according to competitive dynamics.

As a separate response from the thread I just posted - It's possible that the miner attempting to propagate a too-large block is perfectly capable of processing and propagating it, but the majority of miners according to hash power are not.

In this case, it's time for the overly-capable miner to invest in more hash power in order to push forward their Q supplied to the transaction processing market.

More blocks in a given time = more Q, and smaller individual blocks.

Additionally, with more hash power, they increase the share of the network as measured by hash power that is capable of handling these larger blocks.

Their profit margins increase, while others' margins decrease.

Competition.

/pay @194 $0.5

/pay @189 $0.5

/pay @397 $1

/pay @243 $1

To me, the limit does not primary represent subsidizing uncompetitive miners. Has this been the main stated reason? To me, a lean full node was always for assessment of rules and txs, as those not assessing money were _always_ defrauded historically.

/pay @39 $1

What rules are you referring to? Can you take a look at: https://wiki.bitcoinsv.io/index.php/Protocol ?
The transactions and the chain integrity can be verified using SPV AFAIK.

Let's consider the possibility that user's home nodes are checking rules and validity of transactions.

What happens if they think the rules are wrong, or an invalid transaction was mined?

To shortcut this, I'm just going to make the BTC argument and tear it up as I go.

The argument is essentially that all node operators will boycott the invalid chain, both directly on chain, and on exchanges.

Problem number one:
This is an argument for coordinated collective action.

This is a market power argument.

As such, it must be recognized that each individual user has nearly zero market power as an individual.

Exchanges, on the other hand, have significant market power as individual actors.

Miners, too, have significant market power, especially since they are the producers of the chain.

This makes capitulation of users more likely than miners or exchanges.

Essentially, the "muh full node matter!" argument becomes "muh exchanges matter!" because the exchanges are the path through which all competitive market power between chains flows.

So, exchanges have the demand side power, miners have supply side power.

Already, user nodes don't matter. Full stop. Because users don't produce! They can only choose between the options given to them by producers, which are exchanges, or miners.

And there goes the BTC position entirely.

Now we have another dynamic to consider:
Which is more powerful, exchanges or miners?

This is the real battle that has been waged in Bitcoin.

BCH has taken the "exchanges are most powerful" approach.
BSV has taken the "miners are most powerful" approach.

Exchanges and other economic nodes.

Have many times u gotta bang your head on the wall until you see that?

Maybe it will change in the future but unlikely.

This is an interesting question because it depends on the conditions.

When people use the chain, txs are the means by which consumer power is conveyed.

When people speculate between assets, exchanges are the means by which consumer power is conveyed.

Over time, as the subsidy diminishes, miners will not be able to survive without transaction fees as revenue.

IOW, the conditions for Bitcoin's very survival depend not on people trading through exchanges, but on people transacting with Bitcoin.

End result?

The only case in which Bitcoin survives is when people transact, which eliminates "exchanges are more powerful" as the market dynamic because transaction fees become more important than price of the coin for miner's profit margins.

In summary:
"Users are most powerful" is wrong.
"Exchanges are most powerful" is wrong.
"Miners are most powerful" is correct, when adoption occurs.

If adoption doesn't occur, Bitcoin dies.

Conclusion:
Miners determine network consensus through Nakamoto Consensus, as stated and designed by Bitcoin's creator, Satoshi Nakamoto.

Don't like it? Stiff!

Consumers of the chain cannot choose a chain that isn't being produced.

and on the other hand miners of the chain can produce all they want but need someone to sell to

Which implies a market clearing rate for transaction processing in a competitive market.

If your goal is to act as a boycott against miners providing competitive services, other consumers will outcompete you in seeking their services.

I absolutely don't agree with this.

I saw way to much evidence to the contrary over the years.

Here are the "miners" you speak of. They got absolutely cucked.

https://twetch.app/t/7fff32f9214e7bc234c60b81c90944489a012052f9c4bde97fb700840ed478dc

The current block subsidy is 1/4 what it was when that picture was taken.

The entire dynamic is changing away from price as the most important factor to transaction volume.

Additionally, those miners didn't call the UASF bluff. They were idiots.

You need to start seriously thinking about the dynamics that are involved here. Relying on conditions from 2015-2017 will not serve you well as we move forward.

Hodling = no economic weight
"Muh node" = no economic weight

Transacting = economic weight

If you disagree with me, then explain to me how miners with insignificant transaction volume actually care about the exchanges when there is also an insignificant block subsidy.

You just proved my point about the miners.

Are you saying miners are behaving irrationaly? I think they are

Market values BSV at fuck all and fuck all miners are mining it. I'm probably missing the point here of what you asking

No, I didn't prove your point about miners. You're talking like someone who didn't actually live through that time.

I'm saying miners did not, in 2017, exercise their power as miners. The reasons why are complex, but it was a dumb move overall.

Regarding coin prices, these markets are overwhelmingly dominated by people speculating on what other people will do.

When that changes to people acting on local information, those speculators will switch surprisingly fast.

When all of that shifts, miners will shift, too, because miners are operating in a 3 chain, still block subsidy dominated market.

Adoption will change all of this, through several mechanisms.